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LETHAL REFLECTION:
NEW YORK'S NEW DEATH PENALTY
AND VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENTS
"It is the common judgment of man that to deprive
the criminal of his life is the greatest punishment
known to modem times."1
I. Introduction
Tuesday, December 7, 1993, seemed as though it would end
as uneventfully as it had begun for the riders of the Long Island (New
York) Commuter Railroad.2 The 5:33p.m. bound for Hicksville
pulled out of Pennsylvania Station on Manhattan's west side crowded
with commuters pondering their uncompleted Christmas shopping
and the necessary preparations for holiday visits from beloved friends
and relatives.3 As the train approached the Merillon Avenue station
in Garden City, a man stood up, reached into his bag, pulled out a
9-millimeter semi-automatic Ruger handgun and began to fire
indiscriminately into the heads and bodies of the stunned and trapped
passengers.4 When the gunman ran out of ammunition, he calmly
' People v. Frost, 117 N.Y.S. 524, 527 (N.Y. 1909).
2 See, e.g., Primetime Live, (ABC television broadcast, Dec. 9, 1993); The Week in Review,
(CNN television broadcast, Dec. 12, 1993).
3 See, e.g., Maureen Fan, Nightmare Aboard Car 3, NEWSDAY (New York), Dec. 12,
1993, at 4.
4 Nancy Gibbs, Up In Arms: A Train Massacre Intensifies the Demand for Gun Control
... and for Guns, TIME, Dec. 20, 1993, at 18.
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reloaded and resumed, his deadly act.' The man was eventually
tackled and subdued by other riders, but not before he had taken the
lives of six people and wounded nineteen others.
The gunman, Colin Ferguson, was indicted and brought to
trial in an emotionally charged courthouse under the glare of intense
media coverage.7 The defendant proclaimed his innocence, claiming
another man had taken Ferguson's weapon and committed the act.'
The jury convicted Ferguson of six counts of murder in the second
degree,9 nineteen counts of attempted murder and various weapons
charges. 10
When the court reconvened for sentencing shortly thereafter,
the defendant fidgeted nervously at the defense table." One-by-one
the survivors and the family members of those who perished took the
witness stand and told Judge Donald Belfi what Ferguson's acts had
'Eric Nagourney& Michael Alexander, I Kept Waiting for Next Bullet, NEWSDAY, Dec.
9, 1993, at 17.
6 See, e.g., Maureen Fan, Pain & Outrage; Massacres' Victims Tell Their Suffering,
NEWSDAY, Mar. 22, 1995, at A3.
The intense media coverage followed not only because of the terrifying facts of the case,
but also because the defendant chose to represent himself, and, in doing so, was able to
cross-examine the very witnesses he had shot on the train. Daniel Wise, Accused Train
Gunman Claims He is 'Scapegoat, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 27, 1995, at 1.
See, e.g., Survivors Cheer Train Killer's Life Terms, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 23, 1995, at 7
[hereinafter Survivors Cheer].
9 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (McKinney 199 1). Before New York reinstated the death
penalty, murder in the first degree was reserved for defendants who were accused of killing
police officers or corrections officers in the line of duty. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27
(McKinney 1974). Murder in the second degree applied to all other premeditated murders.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (McKinney 1974). See also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.30
(McKinney 1974).
to Survivors Cheer, supra note 8, at 7.
"John T. McQuiston, L.I.RR. Victims Callfor Life Sentence, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1995,
at B5.
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done to their lives.' 2 Carolyn McCarthy, whose husband was killed
and whose son lost 10 percent of his brain, spoke softly and told
Ferguson that he was evil. 3 Robert Guigliano, who survived a bullet
wound to his chest, erupted in the courtroom. 4 "You're nothing but
a piece of scum. You're an animal. Five minutes, that's all I need
with you. Five minutes."'5 Frank Barker, a father of seven children,
survived five bullet wounds.'6 Barker told the Court, "I believe it is
within the moral rights of this society to sentence Colin Ferguson to
death."' 1
7
Judge Belfi took these emotional words into consideration and
sentenced Colin Ferguson to six consecutive life sentences, plus fifty
more years for nineteen counts of attempted murder, two weapons
charges and reckless endangerment."
In one respect, Ferguson was lucky.' 9 Then-New York
Governor, Mario Cuomo and his predecessor, Hugh Carey, had
successfully blocked thirteen years of legislative attempts to reinstate
12 See, e.g., Fan, supra note 6, at A3. Kevin McCarthy, who sustained a serious brain
injury and whose father was killed, told Judge Belfi that because of Ferguson, McCarthy was
"sentenced to a life of pain and suffering." Id. Carolyn McCarthy, Kevin's mother,
remarked that when Ferguson killed her husband Dennis, Ferguson had taken away her best
friend. Id. See also Eleanor Randolph, Victims Rage at Gunman: Survivors ofN.Y.
Shooting Address Court, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 1995, at Al.
. Randolph, supra note 12, at Al. See also Fan, supra note 6, at A3. Carolyn McCarthy,
one of the most outspoken victims of this tragedy, made it clear that she would not allow
herselfto be consumed by rage against Ferguson. Id. In 1996, McCarthy ran for and won
a seat in the U.S. House of Representativesbased on her campaign for gun control. See Gail
Collins, EditorialNotebook: Those Gender-Gap Blues, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1996, at 12;
Eric Painin, Sketches ofNew House Members, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 1996, at A39.






" Survivors Cheer, supra note 8.
'9 See, e.g. , Debra McGrath-Kerr, Law Officers Ride LIRR Free; Pataki in Garden City
to Sign Measure To Upgrade Security, DAILY NEWS (New York), Aug. 4, 1995, at 1.
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the death penalty in New York.2' Had Ferguson committed his act
after September 1, 1995, he would surely have been a prime candidate
for a lethal injection.2
Was justice served in Ferguson's case? Would this case have
even qualified under New York's new death penalty? What role
would the victims have played if this were a capital case under New
York's new death penalty? How do New York's neighbors, New
Jersey and Pennsylvania, deal with the issue of victim impact
evidence in capital cases?
The Part Two of this Note traces the history of death penalty
jurisprudence in the United States. Part Three of this Note traces the
history of the death penalty in New York. Part Four analyzes the New
York death penalty which was recently signed into law, and Part Five
discusses its first application. Part Six addresses the issue of the
introduction of victim impact statements in capital cases, beginning
with the Supreme Court decisions. Part Seven analyzes the use of
victim statements in New York. Part Eight discusses the arguments
against the employment of victim impact statements. Finally, Part
Nine of this Note focuses on the relationship between victim impact
statements and the death penalty.
20 Robert M. Bohm et al., Current Death Penalty Opinion in New York State, 54 ALB. L.
REv. 819, 821 (1990).
2 Interview with Michael R. Ambrecht, Assistant Counsel to New York Governor George
Pataki, in Albany, N.Y. (Oct. 13, 1995). Lethal injection is defined by N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW
§ 658 as "intravenous injection of a substance or substances in a lethal quantity into the body
of a person convicted [underN.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (McKinney 1991)] until such person
is dead." Currently, states use a variety of methods of execution, with lethal injection the
most common, followed by electrocution. See, e.g., Deborah W. Denno, Is Electrocution
an UnconstitutionalMethod of Execution? The Engineering of Death Over the Century, 35
WM. AND MARY L. REV. 551, 557 (1994). At least one state, Delaware, still uses hanging
as of method of execution. I 1 DEL. CODE ANN. § 4209(2)(f) (1995). Utah continues to
employ a firing squad for some of its executions. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-5.5 (1995).
California utilizes the gas chamber or lethal injection for executions of convicted murderers.
CAL. PEN. CODE § 3604 (West 1995).
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II. The United States Supreme Court
and the Death Penalty
The roots of the death penalty in United States law are found
in the English Penal Code,22 which was applied in the American
colonies before the American Revolution 3 The death penalty was so
highly regarded in the colonies that some states, like Massachusetts,
applied it to as many as thirteen crimes, ranging from adultery to
assault to murder.24 The 1692 Salem, Massachusetts witch trials, for
instance, produced nineteen hangings.
The United States Constitution provides that the federal and
state governments shall not deprive any person of "life, liberty or
property without due process of law.'" 26 Although it is not explicitly
stated, it is clear from this language that the Framers of the
Constitution accepted the death penalty as an acceptable
22 ROBERT M. BAIRD& STUART E. ROSENBAUM, PUNISHMENT AND THE DEATH PENALTY:
THE CURRENT DEBATE 103 (1995).
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 MARK TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONALISSUES: THE DEATH PENALTY 19 (1994). The Salem
witch-hunt was the most extensive in New England history. DAVID D. HALL,
WITCH-HUNTING IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURYNEW ENGLAND 280 (1991). During the winter
of 1691-92, "certain girls and young women began to experience the symptoms of diabolical
'possession'." Id. At first, the villagers applied traditional prayer in an attempt to remedy
the situation, but when this failed, they began to believe that certain other village residents
were responsible for the diabolical behavior. Id. As an investigation began, it became
apparent to the villagers that several of their fellow residents "had organized a major
conspiracy [with the devil] complete with meetings in the woods, the black sacrament of the
witches' Sabbath, and signings of a covenant." Id. at 280-81. One-by-one residents were
tried, convicted and hanged. Id. at 281. Some residents even confessed to covenanting with
the devil. Id. By June of 1692, the procedures of the court began to concern local ministers
and other influential residents, and the investigations and executions subsequently ceased.
Id. The statute enacted in 1648 in the Massachusetts Bay Colony read: "If any man or
woman be a WITCH, that is, hath or consulteth with a familiar spirit, they shall be put to
death. Exodus 22:18 Leviticus 20:27 Deuteronomy 18:10-11." Id. at 315.26 U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV.
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punishment?7 However, the Framers added a caveat: that "cruel and
unusual punishment" not be inflicted? The question then arose: how
could the Eighth Amendment 9 withdraw the power conferred by the
Fifth Amendment30 The answer lies in incorporation.3 Until 1962,
the Eighth Amendment had not been applied to the states, thus only
the federal government had to concern itself with the Eighth
Amendment's restrictions? 2 Then, in 1962, California sought to make
it a crime to simply be a drug addict.33 The Supreme Court found this
to be cruel and unusual punishment because it considered addiction
a disease and not a crime.34 Through the Fourteenth Amendment,35
27 U.S. CONST. amend. V. See also United States v. Matthews, 13 M.J. 501, 521
(A.C.M.R. 1982). By not explicitly stating that capital punishment is prohibited, many
commentatorsbelieve that the Framers agreed that the death penalty was appropriate in some
cases, especially in light of the fact that executions were common during the years leading
up to the 1787 Constitutional Convention. Id. This issue was also discussed in Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
28 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The definition of "cruel and unusual punishment" has
changed over the years to comport with public opinion. See, e.g., James G. Wilson, The Role
of Public Opinion in Constitutionallnterpretatiot; 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1037, 1084 (1993).
The Supreme Court has often consulted public opinion to clarify this constitutional
requirement. Id.
29 The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in relevant part, that
... cruel and unusual punishment [shall not be] inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
30 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in relevant part, that
... nor shall any person.., be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law .... U.S. CONST. amend. V.
31 TUSHNET, supra note 25, at 10. Simply stated, incorporation is the theory that the 14th
Amendment's Due Process Clause guarantees that the rights specified in the Bill of Rights
apply to the states, not just the federal government. The Supreme Court has held that any
right which is "fundamental in the context of the [judicial] processes maintained by the
American states," will be incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment. Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 150 n.14 (1968).
32 TUSHNET, supra note 25, at 11.
3' Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
14 Id at 677.
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the Court applied the Eighth Amendment to California and the rest of
the states. 6
Then, in 1963, a Supreme Court Justice finally questioned the
legality of the breadth of the death penalty.37 In Rudolph v. Alabamd'
the Court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari? 9 However, Justice
Arthur Goldberg wrote a memorandum questioning the legality of
applying the death penalty to defendants convicted of rape.4"
Goldberg was convinced that the standards of decency in civilized
society had evolved to such a point that the taking of a life by the state
was barbaric and inhumane.4 Goldberg also addressed the question
of "unnecessaryand excessive punishment."' Goldberg, unconvinced
'5 The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in relevant
parts, that:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
36 TUSHNET, supra note 25, at 11-12.
3' Rudolph v. Alabama, 152 So.2d 662 (Ala. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 889 (1963).
31 Id. at 664. On the evening of August 1, 1961, the defendant, a young black man,
entered the home of a white woman in Birmingham, Alabama. Id The defendant raped the
woman in front of her two young sons. Id. After the rape, the defendant beat the woman,
cutting and bruising her face. Id. The defendant subsequently confessed to the crime. Id.
On appeal, the defendant raised the issue of equal protection. Id. at 665. The defendant
claimed that when white men rape black women, the death penalty is rarely imposed. Id.
However, when a black man rapes a white woman, the death penalty is regularly ordered.
Id. The Alabama Supreme Court refused to take judicial notice of that claim, going as far
as saying that the United States Supreme Court does not require the states to 'strike a balance
between sentences imposed on defendants of the white and colored races .... Id.
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that the death penalty had anything to do with deterrence, asserted that
it was merely retribution.43 While Goldberg realized that his
argument would likely prove to be unpersuasive, his concern about
disproportionate punishment convinced him to identify certain types
of crimes, such as rape and other sexual offenses, that he believed did
not warrant execution. 4
Just nine years later, in Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme
Court invalidated Georgia's death penalty because it violated the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution.46 However,
in the 5-4 Furman decision, in which each justice wrote a separate
opinion,47 it became clear that three Justices, Douglas, Stewart and
White, might be satisfied with the constitutionality of the death
penalty statutes if they were refined to address their concerns. 48 These
three justices indicated that they would vote to uphold death penalty
statutes that could reasonably ensure that juries had such detailed
43 Id. Deterrence and retribution are two of the most commonly cited justifications for
death penalty legislation and jurisprudence. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE, MODERN
CRIMINAL LAW (1988); Robert P. Gritton, Capital Punishment: New Weapons in the
Sentencing Process, 24 GA. L. REV. 423 (1990). Generally, there are four major rationales
for punishing criminals: I) deterrence, 2) retribution,3) rehabilitation,and 4) incapacitatrn.
Prof. Michael Perlin, Criminal Law lecture at New York Law School (Jan. 25, 1995). The
theory supporting deterrence is that others, and in some cases the specific defendant, will be
discouraged from committing future crimes. Id. Those who support the theory of retribution
claim that by allowing an "eye for an eye," society's moral standards are reinforced, and that
vigilantism is prevented. Id. The theory of rehabilitation is that criminals should be given
therapeutictreatment to cure and reform them so that they will not commit any future crimes.
Id. Incapacitztion, which is essentially a lesser form of retribution, requires that criminals
be separated from society through isolation. Id.
44 Rudolph, 375 U.S. at 889-90.
45 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
46 Id.
47 Id.
41 NEIL P. COHEN& DONALDJ. HALL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE POST-INVESTIGATIVE
PROCESS 689 (1995). The nine opinions in the Furman case totaled 250 pages, the most in
Supreme Court history. Id.
446
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guidelines that a sentence of death could not be imposed arbitrarily or
capriciously' 9 After Furman, state legislatures scrambled to modify
their death penalty statutes in an attempt to remove unconstitutional
arbitrariness ° Since 1976, at least thirty-five states have reformulated
their death penalty statutes to meet the requirements set forth by the
Court in Furman.1
The Supreme Court next reviewed the constitutionalityof the
death penalty in Gregg v. Georgia.52 In that case, the Court stated that
the death penalty was not per se cruel and unusual punishment, and
that Georgia's statute was valid.53 The Court concluded that Georgia
sufficiently removed any arbitrariness by instituting detailed
sentencing procedures that included a bifurcatedjury system whereby
the sentencing phase was separated from the guilt/innocence phase. 4
The Georgia law also required that at least one aggravating
circumstance, as listed in the statute, be proven at trial before a
49 Id. at 690. The Court, however, failed to give examples of adequate sentencing
guidelines. See, e.g., Daniel Ross Harris, Capital Sentencing After Walton v. Arizona: A
Retreat From the "Death is Different" Doctrine, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1389, 1396 (1991).
50 COHEN & HALL, supra note 48, at 690.
"' See, e.g., State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123 (NJ Sup. Ct. 1987). Many states have dealt
with the issue of constitutionality by increasing the breadth of aggravating circumstances.
For example, Arizona now lists ten aggravating circumstances in its death penalty statute for
the jury to consider. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.F (West 1989). Florida lists eleven
aggravating circumstances in its death penalty law. FLA. STAT. ANN. CH. 921.141(5)
(Harrison Supp. 1991). Many states also require automatic appellate review of all death
penalty convictions. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW. § 470.30(2) (McKinney 1995). See
generally Beverly Lowry, Let God Sort Them Out? Refining the Individualization
Requirement in Capital Sentencing. Crossed Over: A Murder, A Memoir, 102 YALE L. J.
835, 867 (1992) (discussing how the removal of arbitrariness in sentencing fails to reduce
the overall arbitrariness of capital punishment given the numerous discretionary factors
involved in such a decision).
52428 U.S. 153 (1976).
13 Id. See also COHEN & HALL, supra note 48, at 690.
54 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206-07.
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sentence of death was imposed." Similarly, the statute required direct
review by the Georgia Supreme Court. 6 The Court signified that any
statute that narrowed the jury's discretion would be more likely to
pass constitutional scrutiny. 7 However, too little discretion would
also render a statute unconstitutional 58 For instance, several states
imposed mandatory death sentences for specific crimes; mandates
which the Court struck down as unconstitutional because the statutes
did not allow the trier of fact to consider any mitigating
circumstances.59 In 1977, fourteen years after Justice Goldberg
suggested it,6" the Court ruled that death is an unconstitutionally
excessive punishment for rape.6
III. The History of the Death Penalty
in New York State
At one time New York, as did many of the original colonies,
employed the death penalty for a variety of offenses.6" In 1835, New
51 Id. at 165 n.9. Aggravatingcircumstances,for example, included killing a peace officer
serving in the line of duty or murder during the commission of a felony. See, e.g., Bryan K.
Fair, Using Parrots to Kill Mockingbirds: Another Racial Prosecution and Wrongful
Conviction in Maycomb, 45 ALA. L. REV. 403, 436 (1994).
56 COHEN & HALL, supra note 48, at 690.
" See, e.g., Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
51 See also COHEN & HALL, supra note 48, at 691.
'9 Mitigating circumstances include intoxication, age, insanity and other forms of
diminished mental capacity. See, e.g., Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson
v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
60 See supra text accompanying notes 37-44.
61 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
62 For example, in New York, one could be executed for various types of counterfeiting.
See, e.g., Charles J. Reid, Jr., Tyburn, Thanatos, and Marxist Historiography: The Case of
the London Hanged 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1158, 1196 (1994). See also PHILIP E. MACKEY,
HANGING IN THE BALANCE: THE ANTI-CAPITAL PUNISHMENT MOVEMENT IN NEW YORK
STATE, 1776-1861 (1982).
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York became one of the first states to end public executions.63 Then,
in 1890, in an attempt to make executions quick. and painless, New
York became the first state to utilize the electric chair.' Despite these
ostensibly sympathetic legislative changes, between the years 1890
and 1963 (the year of New York's last execution) New York
electrocuted 695 prisoners, more than any other state.65
As of 1917, New York considered four types of homicides
severe enough to warrant the ultimate punishment.66 They were: (1)
deliberate and premeditated murder; (2) acts that were imminently
dangerous to others, evincing a "depraved mind" lacking
premeditation; (3) murder during the commission of arson; and (4)
homicide occurring because of an intentional act of tampering with
any facet of the operation of a railroad. 67 By 1965, New York's law
had not changed very much.68 With the exception of railroad
tampering, New York still sentenced to death individuals convicted
of: homicide committed by premeditated acts, acts that demonstrated
a depraved indifference to the value of human life, and murders that
occurred during the commission of other felonies.69
New York's death penalty law did undergo revision after 1973
when the New York Court of Appeals struck down the existing death
63 Bohm, supra note 20, at 819.
64 1d.
6 See generally M. WATr Espy, EXECUTIONS IN NEW YORK STATE: NAMES, RACES OF
OFFENDER/VICTIM, COUNTIES AND DATES OF EXECUTIONS, 1890-1963 (1995). This total
includes the executions of Ethel and Julius Rosenberg for violations of federal espionage
laws in New York. Id. See also WILLIAM J. BOWERS, LEGAL HOMICIDE: DEATH As
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1864-1982 (1984).
66 BOWERS, supra note 65.
67 Id.
61 See generally N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney 1965).
691d. The category of offenses subject to felony-murderprosecutions grew from just arson
in 1917 to include nine other offenses. Those offenses included: robbery, burglary,
kidnapping, arson, rape, sodomy, sexual abuse, and escape from prison in the second and
first degree. Id.
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penalty as unconstitutional because it did not provide ample guidance
for the jury.7" In 1974, the New York legislature amended New
York's death penalty statute to define the types of homicides that were
punishable by death and the affirmative defenses available.7 But
because this new statute mandated a death sentence, and because the
statute did not provide for evidence of the defendant's character, the
New York Court of Appeals struck down the law in 1977 in light of
the Furman decision.72 In 1984, the Court of Appeals struck down
the last remnant of New York's death penalty.73 Because the statute
did not allow for consideration of any mitigating circumstances, and
in light of Furman, the Court held the law unconstitutional.74
Political sentiment for the death penalty resurged in 1994,
when George Pataki was elected governor of New York.75 Pataki
made reinstatement of the death penalty an important part of his
70 People v. Fitzpatrick, 32 N.Y.2d 499 (N.Y. 1973). In this case, the defendant shot and
killed two police officers who had stopped his car for suspicion of robbery. Id. New York's
highest court ruled that since the death penalty statute left "infliction of the death penalty
solely to the discretion of the jury," the statute was unconstitutional in light of the Supreme
Court decision in Furman. Id. at 145.
71 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (McKinney 1974).
72 People v. Davis, 43 N.Y.2d 17 (N.Y. 1977). In this case, the defendant was convicted
of killing a police officer while in the process of robbing a grocery store. Id. See supra text
accompanying notes 45-51 for a discussion of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
71 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (McKinney 1974). This statute provided for mandatory death
sentences for those convicted of killing a police or corrections officer, or any homicide by
a inmate currently serving a life sentence. Id.
"4 People v. Smith, 63 N.Y.2d 41 (1984). In this case, the defendant was an inmate at the
Green Haven Correctional Facility in Dutchess County, serving a twenty-five-years-to life
sentence. Id. On May 15, 1981, the defendant strangled to death Donna Payant, a
corrections officer, and dumped her body in the trash. Id. See supra text accompanying
notes 45-51 for a discussion of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
" ReutersNorth American Wire, Cuomo Loses Re-Election Bid in New York State, Nov.
8, 1994. See also Ariane M. Schreiber, Note, States That Kill: Discretion and the Death
Penalty-A Worldwide Perspective, 29 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 263, 265 (1996) (noting that
Pataki held frequent news conferences on the death penalty up until the last hours of the
campaign to increase support for his candidacy).
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campaign platform.76 In Pataki's first annual address to the State,
before signing the new death penalty into law, he announced his
legislative agenda:77
[A]s for criminals who commit the ultimate crime,
they should expect to be punished by the ultimate
sanction, the death penalty. The time has come to
protect the personal freedom of New York's
law-abiding citizens, to show compassion for the
victims of crime and to send a clear, unmistakable
message to violent criminals: no more excuses. 78
On September 1, 1995, New York's new death penalty went into
effect.79
IV. New York's New Death Penalty
New York Penal Law section 125.27 was amended to include
several additional crimes that qualify for the death penalty, and to
institute procedures that are narrowly tailored to conform to Supreme
Court decisions.8 There currently appears to be little doubt about the
76 Charisse Jones, The 1994 Campaign; Upstate, Pataki's New Message: Giuliani
Endorsement Has Price, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1994, at AI.
" Pataki: Bipartisanship A 2-Way Street, TIMES-UNION (Albany, New York), Jan. 5,
1995, at A7 (quoting Governor George Pataki's April, 1995 Annual Message to the State of
New York).
78 Id.
79 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 38 (McKinney 1995).
" Interview with Michael R. Ambrecht, supra note 21.
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constitutionality of the new law.8' For example, the crimes listed that
warrant the death penalty are some of the most specific and narrowly
tailored in the United States. 2 In fact, conspicuously absent from the
New York law is the average, "run-of-the-mill' murder.8 3 New York
has also removed the "depraved indifference to the value of human
life" catch-all, and replaced it with behavior that is "cruel and
wanton," a much higher standardto demonstrate.8 4 In contrast to New
York's new law, many other states continue to constitutionally utilize
the "depraved indifference" catch-all. 85
Some remnants of old New York laws can be found in the new
law.86 For instance, the intentional killings of a police officer 7 or of
a corrections officer in the line of duty, 8 . are still punishable by
death.89 Also, if a defendant is imprisoned for life when he or she
81 Id. The New York statute survived its first constitutional challenge in late 1996. See
Daniel Wise, Death Penalty Held Constitutional, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 18, 1996, at I (citing
People v. Chinn, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 19, 1996, at 31). The claim asserted in this case was that
the statute "violated contemporary norms of decency" and "is likely to be'disproportionately
applied to minorities." Id. The court rejected these claims and upheld the death sentence.
Id.
82 Wise, supra note 81, at 1. For example, contract killings, killings to intimidate
witnesses, or repeat killers could get the death penalty. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.27(1)(a)(v);
(l)(a)(vi); (l)(a)(ix), (xi) (McKinney 1995).
83 Wise, supra note 81, at I. Run-of-the-millmurders are loosely defined as those killings
where "pure evil" is not manifested. Id. For example, while a drive-by shooting may be
horrifying, it is certainly more "evil" if one were to discover that the murderer was hired to
commit the gruesome act. Id.
84 Id. See also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(l)(a)(x) (McKinney 1995).
85 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 11-3 (4)(c) (West 1997).
86 Compare N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (McKinney 1974) and N.Y. PENAL LAW
§§ 125.27(l)(a)(i) - (iv) (McKinney 1995).
87 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(1)(a)(i) (McKinney 1995). Compare N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 125.27(1)(a)(i) (McKinney 1974).
88 N.Y. PENAL LAW §125.27(1)(a)(iii) (McKinney 1995). Compare N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 125.27(1)(a)(ii) (McKinney 1974).
89 N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.27(1)(a)(1); (1)(a)(iii) (McKinney 1974).
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commits a murder, he or she may be subjected to the death penalty.9"
Similarly, the felony-murder proscription remains, punishing with
death the identical crimes which were punished under the law in New
York up until 1974. 9"
But many new, rather specific crimes are included in the new
law.92 For example, if the killing is undertaken toprevent or inhibit
testimony by a witness to a prior crime, either by killing the potential
witness or a witness' family member, or as retribution for testimony,
the perpetrator is subject to the death penalty.93 If the killing is
committed for pecuniary interest, that crime is also punishable by
death. 4 Additionally, if a person intends to seriously injure or kill a
third person, and does kill that individual,' that, too, is punishable by
death.9' The new law also encompasses the intentional killing of a
judge.9€ Repeat offenders are susceptible to a death sentence as
well.97 Under the new law, a perpetrator who has been convicted of
a prior murder in any jurisdiction," or who has intentionally killed
two or more people within New York within the previous two years,
is subject to death.99
Finally, New York allows lethal injection when the "defendant
acted in an especially cruel and wanton manner... intending to inflict
9 0N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(l)(a)(iv) (McKinney 1995). Compare N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 125.27(1)(a)(iii) (McKinney 1974),.
9' N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(1)(a)(vii) (McKinney' 1995). Compare N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 125.25(3) (McKinney 1965).
92 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.27(1)(a)(v) - (xi) (McKinney 1995).
931d. § 125.27(l)(a)(v).
94 1d. § 125.27(i)(a)(vi).
9' Id. § 125.27(1)(a)(viii). The third person described in this sub-paragraph is an
additional person who is not the intended victim of the criminal transaction. Id.96 Id. § 125.27(1)(a)(xii).
97 N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.27(l)(a)(ix), (xi) (McKinney 1995).
9
'1d. § 125.27(l)(a)(ix).
9 Id. § 125.27(1)(a)(xi). '
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torture upon the victim prior to the victim's death."' ° The New York
legislature purposefully incorporated this narrow category of
death-eligible crimes which involve torture as the catch-all section of
the law.' During the drafting of this legislation, representatives from
the New York State Senate, Assembly, and Governor's office agreed
that some crimes are so inherently evil, that justice simply demands
retribution."2 Governor Pataki personally believes that deterrence is
served by the specter of the death penalty."0 3
Sentencing under New York's new law is designed to comport
with Supreme Court decisions. 0 4  Section 400.27 of New York's
Criminal Procedure Law exemplifies this. The legislature, by
amending this section to allow for a bifurcated trial, whereby a
sentencing hearing follows the guilt/innocence trial, rendered the law
Io ld. §. 125.27(l)(a)(x).
.0. Interview with Michael R. Ambrecht, supra note 21.
102 Id.
'03 Id. See also Executive Memoranda from New York Governor George Pataki, Death
Penalty-Imposition and Procedures-Assignment of Counsel, A-36 (Mar. 7, 1995)
[hereinafter Pataki, Executive Memoranda].
04 Interview with Michael R. Ambrecht, supra note 21; Pataki, Executive Memoranda,
supra note 103, at A-37. See generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (juries
cannot have unfettered discretion in sentencing); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)
(bifurcated proceedings are constitutional to reduce arbitrariness; a death penalty jury must
find at least one statutorily defined aggravating circumstance to exist to impose a sentence
of death; mitigatingcircumstancesmust be considered by the jury); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S.
262 (1976) (death sentencingmust be individualized so the jury may consider any evidence
in mitigation); Proffit v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (especially heinous, atrocious or cruel
killings warrant the death penalty); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976)
(mandatory death sentences for particular offenses are unconstitutional since they do not
provide the jury with the opportunity to view each defendant individually); Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 548 (1977) (death penalty for defendants convicted of rape is
unconstitutionallydisproportionae and therefore violates the 8th Amendment); Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (in assessing proportionality, the focus must be on the
defendant alone, and not on the conduct of others who participated in the crime); Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (it is unconstitutional to execute those who are insane);
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (it is constitutional to execute someone who is
mentally retarded).
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in compliance with the opinion in Gregg v. Georgia.'°5 Several other
procedural safeguards were inserted into the law to ensure its
constitutionality.1 0 6 For instance, the prosecution has the discretion
not to utilize the death penalty even if the crime is covered by the
law. 117 Also, the trial court is required to determine whether any
jurors have a bias that would preclude them from being impartial in
either phase. 8 Furthermore, only those aggravating factors'0 9 which
are proven beyond a reasonable doubt at trial may be considered by
jurors during sentencing." 0 Finally, the New York Court of Appeals
is required to review the record of every case in which a death
sentence is imposed to ensure impartiality and proportionality of the
sentence."'
At the sentencing hearing, the defendant may present any
evidence relative to any mitigating factor," 2 including any reliable
hearsay evidence which would not be allowed at the guilt/innocence
phase, and need only show the existence of these factors by the lesser
standard of a preponderanceof the evidence." 3 The mitigating factors
listed in the New York law include evidence that the defendant has no
prior criminal record," 4 is mentally retarded or suffered from
105 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(1) (McKinney 1995). For a discussion of Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), see supra text accompanying notes 52-61.
16 Interview with Michael R. Ambrecht, supra note 21.
107 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(l) (McKinney 1995).
108 Id. § 400.27(2). If the trial court finds that a jury member may be prejudiced against
any party during the separate sentencing proceeding, the court may discharge that juror and
replace him or her with an alternate. Id.
109 Id. § 400.27(3). In addition to those aggravating factors found at trial, at the sentencing
proceedingthejurors may also consider: i) acts of terrorism; and 2) two or more prior felony
convictions. Id. §§ 400.27(3); (7)(a), (b).
"10 Id. § 400.27(3).
I. d. § 470.30(2). This right is not waivable. Id.
112 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 400.27(9)(a) T (f) (McKinney 1995).
"l Id. § 400.27(6).
"4 Id. § 400.27(9)(a).
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diminished capacity," 5 was under duress or domination," 6 played a
minor role in the killing," 7 was under the influence of drugs or
alcohol at the time of the killing, or was otherwise emotionally
disturbed,'18 or any other information relevant to the crime or the
defendant's background that would somehow explain his or her
behavior. 119
The prosecution, on the other hand, may introduce to the jury
only those aggravating circumstances that were proved beyond a
reasonable doubt at the jury trial. 2 ° Notwithstandingthe.crimes listed
above, the New York law also lists two aggravating factors that can
be considered by the jury in its determination of the defendant's
sentence.'2' First, any act of terrorism may be considered an
aggravating factor.'22 Second, if in the last ten years the defendant has
committed two or more felony offenses that involved the use or
threatened use of a deadly weapon, that fact may be considered by the
jury as an aggravating circumstance.'23
New York law also incorporates the protection of jury
unanimity.2 4 A sentence of death cannot be imposed unless the jury
Id. § 400.27(9)(b).
116 Id. § 400.27(9)(c).
"L N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(9)(d) (McKinney 1995).
HI ld. § 400.27(9)(e).
19 Id. § 400.27(9)(f).
120 Id. § 400.27(3). At the sentencing proceeding, "the aggravating factor or factors
proved at trial shall be deemed established beyond a reasonable doubt..." and will not be
re-litigated. Id.
121 Id. § 400.27(7)(c).
122 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(7)(a) (McKinney 1995) (noting that terrorism is
generally defined as any attempt to coerce a government or civilian population through
intimidation or murder).
123 Id. § 400.27(7)(b). A felony is defined by federal law as any crime "punishable by
death or one or more years of imprisonment." 18 U.S.C. § I(1) (1976).
124 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(1 1)(a) (McKinney 1995).
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is unanimous in its decision' 25 If the jury cannot reach a unanimous
determination of sentencing, the trial judge must impose a sentence
of imprisonment ranging from twenty years to life.'26
A. final factor that sets New York's law apart from those of
other states is its treatment of defendants who are mentally retarded.'27
Under the New York law, if a defendant is sentenced to death and is
subsequently found to be mentally retarded, the death sentence will
be set aside and the defendant will, instead, be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment.'28 New York's refusal to execute mentally retarded
defendants is rare among the states that have a death penalty statute. 2 9
New York's legislature, in crafting this law, clearly relied on
Supreme Court decisions for guidance to ensure the statute's
constitutionality. 3 ° All the factors discussed above demonstrate the
narrowness of the new law.' That narrowness becomes apparent
25 The jury must unanimously find "beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating factor
or factors substantially outweigh the mitigating factor or factors established ..... Id.
126 Id. § 400.27(10).
127 In 1989, of the 37 states with a death penalty, only two, Georgia and Maryland, did not
execute mentally retarded defendants. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
See also V. Stephen Cohen, Exempting the Mentally Retarded From the Death Penalty: A
Comment on Florida's Proposed Legislation, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 457, 468 (1991)
(statingthat "in reaction to Penry, Kentucky, Maryland, New Mexico and Tennessee passed
legislation exempting mentally retarded people from the death penalty").
128N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(12)(c) (McKinney 1995). See also Mary R. Falk &
Eve Cary, Death-Defying Feats: State Constitutional Challenges to New York's Death
Penalty, 4 J. L. & POL'Y 161,227 (1995) (discussing mental retardation as a mitigating factor
under New York's death penalty statute).
129 See Penry, 492 U.S. at 333. The Penry Court made it clear that executing mentally
retarded defendantsis not "categoricallyprohibitedby the 8th Amendment."Id. at 335. New
York's new death penalty does, however, permit the execution of a mentally retarded
defendant if the offense occurs while the defendant is incarcerated for life. N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW § 400.27(12)(d) (McKinney 1995).
30 Interview with Michael R. Ambrecht, supra note 21.
131 Id.
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when New York's law is compared to other states' statutes. Two of
New York's neighbors, New Jersey and Pennsylvania, have death
penalty statutes, but their scope is quite different than that of New
York's statute. 133
As noted above, New York's law lists no less than twelve
types of offenses that are punishable by death-but they are all very
specific-with the catch-all of requiring that the murder be
perpetrated in a cruel and wanton manner.3 4 New Jersey lists three
types of crimes that qualify for the death penalty: when the actor
purposely causes death,'3 1 when the actor knowingly causes death,136
and when the actor commits a felony-murder.137 Pennsylvania lists
only one crime punishable by death: "intentional killing."' 3'  These
broad-based statutes encompass everything from premeditated, brutal
cop-killings, to more common-place intentional acts.1 39  As a
consequence, most of the murders committed annually in New York
will not be subject to the death penalty, whereas, if they had occurred
in New Jersey or Pennsylvania, those same murders would invoke the
death penalty. 140
New York lists twelve aggravating circumstances which can
132 Compare, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.27(1)(a)(i) - (xii) (McKinney 1995) and N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:1 I1-3(a)(I)- (3)(West 1997) and 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2502(A) (1995).
3 Compare, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.27(1)(a)(i) - (xii) (McKinney 1995) and N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 2C: I1-3(a)(l)- (3) (West 1997) and 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2502(A) (1995).
134 N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.27(1)(a)(i) - (xii) (McKinney 1995).
"I N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1 1-3(a)(1) (West 1994).
136 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1 1-3(a)(2) (West 1994).
13 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1 1-3(a)(3) (West 1994).
'31 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2502(A) (1995).
'31 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bracey, 662 A.2d 1062 (Pa. 1995). In that case, the
defendant was convicted of killing a police officer and sentenced to death. Id. at 1065. See
also Commonwealth v. Johnson, 668 A.2d 97 (Pa. 1995). In that case, the defendant was
convicted and sentenced to death for killing his neighbor in retribution for the victim's
harassment of the defendant's girlfriend. Id. at 99-100.
40 Interview with Michael R. Ambrecht, supra note 21.
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be considered by the sentencing jury: the ten types of killings listed
by the statute, plus two additional circumstances. 141 Pennsylvania
lists sixteen aggravating factors, ranging from drug-related killings,
to aircraft hijacking, to the victim's age.44 New Jersey considers
eleven factors to be aggravating, including contract killings and
torture. 43  Conversely, while New York lists six factors which it
construes as mitigating circumstances, 144 both New Jersey and
Pennsylvania list eight. 45
Sentencing procedures in the New Jersey and Pennsylvania
statutes are not nearly as detailed as those in the New York law. 46
While both New Jersey and Pennsylvania require automatic review of
each death sentence by the states' highest courts, precious few other
provisions are included in those statutes which would provide the
defendant with every possible recourse before an execution is carried
out.1
47
14 ' N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(7)(a) (McKinney 1995).
142 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2502(D)(1) - (16) (1995).
143 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C: 11-3(4)(a) - (k) (West 1994).
144 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 400.27(9)(a) - (f) (McKinney 1995).
"45 New Jersey and Pennsylvania list virtually identical mitigating circumstances. They
include: extreme mental or emotional disturbance; victim participation or consent; age of
the defendant; defendant's mental capacity; unusual and substantial duress; oo significant
criminal record; assistancegiven by the defendant to authorities; or any other relevant factor.
See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C: 11-3(5)(a)- (h) (West 1994); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 9711 (E)(1)-
(8)(1995). For a discussion of victim participation or consent as mitigating factors, see
Raymond. J. Pascuccietal, Capital Punishment in 1994: Abandoningthe Pursuit of Fairness
and Consistency, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 1129, 1236 (1984).
1
46 Seegenerally42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 9711(F), (H) (1995); N.J. STAT ANN. § 2C:1 1-3
(West 1994).
1
47 See generally42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 971 1(H)(1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1 1-3(6)(e)
(West 1994).
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V. The First Death Penalty Case
Under New York's New Law
It took less than one month from the effective date of the death
penalty statute before a New York prosecutor decided to pursue the
ultimate punishment. 48 Ulster County District Attorney E. Michael
Kavanagh decided to seek the death penalty against Lawrence
Whitehurst. 49 Whitehurst was indicted for the kidnapping, rape and
beating to death of seven-year-old Rickel Knox on September 21,
1996."0
Other New York prosecutors are highly outspoken on the issue
of the death penalty. 5' Bronx County District Attorney Robert
Johnson has stated that he will not, under any circumstances, seek the
death penalty for murders within his jurisdiction.5 2  Manhattan
141 Shirley E. Perlman, District Attorneys Face a Difficult Decision-Life or
Death-Pataki's Intervention Puts Debate in a Spotlight, NEWSDAY Mar. 31, 1996, at A7
(noting that Ulster County District Attorney E. Michael Kavanagh announced his intent to
seek the death penalty against Lawrence Whitehurst on September 25, 1995).
149 Id.
50 Id. After questioningby the police two days after the girl's disappearance, Whitehurst
led the police to the naked body of the victim. Id. District Attorney Kavanagh noted that
the crime was so "awful" that the death penalty was the only remedy. Id. Kavanagh was so
outraged by the crime that he sought the death penalty despite the fact that the grand jury had
only indicted Whitehurst on second-degree murder charges. George James, Morgenthau
Asks Advice on Seeking Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1995, at B2. In fact, Kavanagh
originally told Whitehurst that if he led the police to the body, the state would not seek the
death penalty, but reneged on the deal after Whitehurst complied. Child Killer Gets Life
Imprisonmen4 N.Y.L.J., Dec. 13, 1996, at 2. Whitehurst eventually plead guilty to second-
degree murder to avoid facing a death penalty trial and was sentenced to life in prison
without the possibility of parole. Id. See also Child Killer Sentenced to Life With No
Parole, THE RECORD (New Jersey), Dec. 13, 1996, at A 13.
15I James, supra note 150 at B2.
'5 Id. Johnson's stance on the death penalty quickly led to a political and legal battle with
New York Governor George Pataki. See Perlman, supra note 148, at A7. On March 14,
1996, New York City Police Officer Kevin Gillespie was shot and killed on a Bronx street.
See Daniel Wise, Appellate Court Hears Challenge to Removal of Bronx Prosecutor,
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District Attorney Robert Morgenthau has publicly stated that he is not
in favor of the death penalty, but has also said that he would seek it
if a case warranted that punishment.'5 3 Nancy Ryan, Chief of the New
York County District Attorney's Office Trial Division, has said that
her office will review the facts of each case and the extenuating
circumstances before arriving at a decision about seeking the death
penalty. 154 One of the factors that the district attorney's office will
consider in coming to a decision is the impact of the crime on the
surviving family members.'55 "Victim impact statements," as they are
N.Y.L.J., Dec. 4, 1996, at 1. The suspect, Angel Diaz, was quickly apprehended and held
without bail at Riker's Island Correctional Facility. Id. D.A. Johnson noted soon after the
arrest that it was his "present intention" to never, under any circumstances, prosecute any
defendant under the new death penalty statute. Id. In a whirlwind of intense media
coverage, Johnson backed away from his original statements, but was still unwilling to state
whether he would ever seek the death penalty. Id At that point, Governor Pataki sought to
remove Johnson from the case, and assigned the prosecution to New York Attorney General
Dennis Vacco, a staunch supporterof the Governor and the death penalty. Id. Johnson then
filed suit against Pataki, claiming that the Governor had overstepped his power by
attempting to remove a district attorney from a case. Id. New York State Supreme Court
Justice Howard R. Silverman dismissed Johnson's suit on the ground that "the Governor's
exercise of his superseder power was not subject to [Silverman's] review." Id. The New
York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision, noting that in removing Bronx
District Attorney Johnson, Governor Pataki had "acted under broad constitutional and
statutory mandates, neither of which placed any limitation on his powers or required him
to justify his actions." Daniel Wise, Prosecutor'sRemoval In Death Case Upheld, N.Y.L.J.,
Mar. 21, 1997, at 1.
15 James, supra note 150, at B2. The first New York City District Attorney to seek the
death penalty was Charles Hynes of Kings County (Brooklyn). Bill Farrell, DA Seeks Death
in Gay Saw-Slain, DAILY NEWS, Sept. 25, 1996, at 2. In the case at issue, the suspect,
Michael Shane Hale, was accused of killing a sixty-two-year-old man that he met in a gay
bar. Id. After the two men argued about the use of the victim's credit cards, the suspect
allegedly killed the victim, put him in the trunk of his car, drove to Lexington, Kentucky,
and then dismembered the body and tossed the parts away. Id. D.A. Hynes has stated that
he is personally opposed to the death penalty. Id.
'54 James, supra note 150, at B2.
155 Id.
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known,' 56 have a brief but contentious existence in Supreme Court
jurisprudence, and continue to represent a constitutional challenge
with regard to the rights of the accused.'57
VI. The U.S. Supreme Court
and Victim Impact Statements:
A. Booth v. Maryland 5 '
The Unites States Supreme Court first analyzed the issue of
the admissibility of victim impact statements at the sentencing phase
of a capital case in Booth v. Maryland.'59 In that case, Booth and an
accomplice, Willie Reid, entered the West Baltimore home of an
elderly couple, with the apparent intent to rob them for money for
drugs. 6 While there, the defendants bound and gagged the couple,
56 See Thomas J. Phalen & Jane L. McClellan, Speaking for the Dead at Death
Sentencing, ARIZONA ATTORNEY, Nov. 31, 1994, at 12-13.
Victim impact statements, in the context of capital
cases, are statements, written or oral, by the friends and
family of the murdered victim, regarding: (I) the
circumstances of the crime; (2) the characteristics of
the victim; (3) the impact of the crime on the friends
and family of the murdered victim; and (4) their
opinion of the defendant and the appropriate sentences.
Id.
'See generally Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987); South Carolina v. Gathers, 490
U.S. 805 (1990); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991). See also Carrie L. Mulholland,
Sentencing Criminals: The Constitutionality of Victim Impact Statements, 60 MO. L. REV.
731 (1995) (discussing the use of victim impact statements in various United States
jurisdictions).
158 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
159 Id.
160 Id at 497-98.
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then stabbed them repeatedly with a kitchen knife.' 6' Two days later
the elderly couple's son discovered their bodies.'62
Booth was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder.'63
The prosecution requested the death penalty, and the defendant asked
to have his sentence determined by the jury, not the judge. 6 4
Pursuant to Maryland law, the State Department of Parole and
Probation drafted a pre-sentence report.'65 The report contained a
description of the defendant's background, his employment and
education history, and his criminal record. 166 The Maryland statute
also required that the pre-sentence report contain a "victim impact
statement describing the effect of the crime on the victim and his
family."' 67  The report was to relate, among other information,
economic losses suffered as a result of the offense, changes in familiar
relationships resulting from the offense, and information regarding
how the offense affected the victim or victim's family.'68 Under the
Maryland statute, the report could either be read directly to the jury,
or family members could be called to testify in court.169
In this case, the report contained statements made by the
victims' family concerning the emotional trauma of the offense, the
personal characteristics of the victims, and the family members'
attitudes toward the defendant. 7 ° Defense counsel objected to the use
161 Id. at 498.
162 Booth, 482 U.S. at 497-98.
163 Id. at 498.
164 Id.
165 MD. CODE ANN., art.41, § 4-609(c) (1986).
" Booth, 482 U.S. at 498.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 498-500.
169 Id. at 499.
170 Id. at 499-500. The victim impact statement said:
The victim's son reports that his parents had been married for fifty-three
years and enjoyed a very close relationship, spending each day together.
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of the statements as unduly inflammatory and irrelevant.171 After his
objection was overruled, defense counsel asked the prosecutor to read
the report to the jury, and not call family members to testify. 72 The
prosecutor agreed.'73
The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction'7 4 and
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the
constitutionality of victim impact statements.'75 The Court reversed
and vacated the death sentence, holding that the introduction of the
victim impact statements at the sentencing phase of the capital case
violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 76
In delivering the opinion of the . Court, Justice Powell
emphasized that past decisions placed strict requirements on juries at
the sentencing phase of a capital case." 7 Citing Gregg v. Georgia, 71
Powell reiteratedthe principle that a sentencing jury must be"'suitably
directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and
capricious action.' ' 79 Additionally, according to Zant v. Stephens, 8 0
He states that his father worked hard all his life and had been retired for
eight years. He describes his mother as a woman who was young at
heart and never seemed like an old lady. She taught herself how to play
bridge when she was in her seventies. Their funeral was the largest in
the history of Levinson Funeral Home and the family received over
1,000 sympathy cards,some from total strangers. Id. at 500 n.3.
'T' Booth, 482 U.S. at 500.
172 Id. at 501.
173 Id.
174 608 A.2d 162 (Md. 1991).
' Booth, 482 U.S. at 501-02.
176 Id. at 502.
177 Id.
178 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
1"9 Booth, 428 U.S. at 502 (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189).
18 462 U.S. 862 (1983). In this case, the defendant, after escaping from prison while
serving a sentence for burglary, was interrupted by the victim while burglarizingthe victim's
home. Id. The defendant beat the victim, then drove him to a neighboring county where he
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a jury must make an "individualized determination" as to whether the
particular defendant should be executed, based on "the character of
the individual and the circumstances of the crime."' 8
The Court divided the statements required by the Maryland
statute into two categories.'82 The first consisted of statements by the
family members about the victims' personal characteristics, as well as
the emotional impact of the crimes on the families.'83 The second
consisted of the opinions of the families about the crime and the
defendant.'84 The Court held that both categories violated the
Constitution. 18
As for the first category, the Court said that the statements
were unconstitutional because they focus the attention of the jury on
the victim, not on the defendant'8 6 as required by Woodson v. North
Carolina."7 If the jury were allowed to consider statements contained
in the first category, it could impose the death sentence based on
factors which were both unknown to the defendant at the time of the
crime, and irrelevant to the defendant's decision to commit the
crime. 18  The second category of statements, those about the crime
and the defendant, were also ruled unconstitutional. The Court
concluded that the sole purpose of those statements was to inflame the
jury, and that they diverted attention away from the relevant evidence
shot the victim twice in the ear at point blank range. Id. at 865.
18l Id. at 879 (cited in Booth, 428 U.S. at 502).
182 Booth, 482 U.S. at 502.
183Id.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 505, 508.
816 Id. at 504.
187 428 U.S. 280 (1976). In this case, the defendant and three accomplices robbed a
grocery store. Id. During the robbery, one of defendant's accomplices shot two employees,
killing one and seriously wounding the other. Id.
s Booth, 482 U.S. at 505.
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presented at trial.189
Justice Powell listed three concerns that supported the
majority's decision to bar victim impact statements. 190 The Court's
first concern was the likelihood that one victim's family members may
be more articulate than another's, or that a victim may not leave a
family behind at all. 9' The result would be arbitrary decisions made
in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 92
The second concern was that a jury should not make a
decision based on other people's perceptions.' 93 The subjective
judgment that one Victim was of questionable character, while another
was of unblemished character, has no role in a capital sentencing
hearing since it does not provide "'a principled way to distinguish
[cases] in which the death penalty was imposed, from the many cases
in which it was not."' 194
The Court's final concern was that the defendant would not
fairly be able to rebut the statements presented by the victims'
families.' 95 A defendant would surely not want to cross-examine the
son of a murder victim in an attempt to show that the son was not
suffering emotionally.196 In any event, should the defendant attempt
to rebut the victim statements, the result would be a "mini-trial" on
the victim's character.'97 The prospect of this, according to the Court,
119 Id. at 508.
190 Id. at 505-07.
-g Id. at 505.
9ld. (statingthat the degree to which a family member is willing or able to speak before
the jury is certainly irrelevant to the issue of whether the defendant should live or die).
'9' Booth, 482 U.S. at 506.
'9" Id. at 506 (quoting Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980)).
'9 Id. at 506-07.
196 ld. at 506.
19' Id. at 507.
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is "more than simply unappealing. '" 9
Because of the foregoing factors, the Court ruled that the
admission of such emotionally charged statements is inconsistent with
the reasoned decision making that the Eighth Amendment
mandates. 99
B. Extending Booth: South Carolina v. Gathers20 °
Two years after the Booth decision, the Court again granted
certiorari in a case that dealt with the issue of victim impact
statements?°' In that case, the defendant was convicted of murdering
a self-proclaimed minister and was sentenced to death.20 2 The victim
was known to carry with him bags containing religious items.20 3
During the trial, the prosecution offered into evidence the religious
items the victim had with him at the time of his death, along with a
voter registration card found in the victim's possession.0 4 At the
sentencing phase, the prosecution offered no new evidence, but
characterized the victim as a religious man who believed in the
98 Booth, 482 U.S. at 507. The Court justified its disallowance of a "mini-trial" by
explainingthat "it could well distract the sentencing jury from its constitutionally required
task-determining whether the death penalty is appropriate in light of the background and
record of the accused and the particular circumstances of the crime." Id. The Court then
went on to "reject the contention that the presence or absence of emotional distress of the
victim's family, or the victim's personal characteristics,are proper sentencing considerations
in this case."
199 Id. at 508-09. In this case, the victims' son stated that "his parents 'were butchered like
animals' and that he 'doesn't think that anyone should be able to do something like that and
get away with it."' Id.
200 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
201 South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
202 Id. at 806-07.
203 Id. at 807.
204 Id. at 810.
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community 05 The clear implication, according to the South Carolina
Supreme Court, was that because the victim was a religious man, his
killer deserved to die.2°6 The United States Supreme Court agreed.2"7
Even though no actual victim impact statements were given in
this case, the prosecution should have been prohibited from
discussing matters relating to the victim's character that were outside
the circumstances of the crime.208 The fact that the defendant went
through the victim's bags, was relevant for comment, by the
prosecution. 2°9 However, the items contained in those bags and the
information that could be gleaned from them were not relevant to the
crime, and were, therefore, inadmissible.2"0
The Court underscored its prior holding that, in considering
whether to impose the death penalty, a jury must tailor the
punishment to the defendant's personal responsibility and- moral
guilt... in a manner proportionate to the defendant's
blameworthiness? 2 The Court found the evidence which attested to
the victim's character indistinguishable from the victim impact
evidence in Booth, in that it diverted the sentencing jury's attention
away from the defendant, and toward the victim.2"3
205 Id.
206 State v. Gathers, 369 S.E.2d 140 (S.C. 1989).
207 Gathers, 490 U.S. at 810.
201 Id. at 811.
209 Id.
2 10 Id. at 811-12.
21 Id. at 810 (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982)).
232 Gathers, 490 U.S. at 810 (citing Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987)).
213 Id. at 811.
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C. A New Direction: Payne v. Tennessee214
Just two years after Gathers, the Supreme Court reversed itself
and ruled that victim impact statements at the sentencing phase of a
capital case are in fact constitutional.1 5  In a majority opinion
delivered by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court, in Payne v.
Tennessee,216 held that the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar to
the admission of victim impact evidence.1 7
Pervis Payne, the defendant, was convicted of two counts of
murder and one count of attempted murder and was sentenced to
death 1 8 Payne spent the morning and early afternoon of the murders
drinking malt liquor and injecting himself with cocaine." 9 At
approximately three o'clock in the afternoon, Payne entered the
victims' apartment complex and made sexual advances toward
twenty-eight-year-old Charisse Christopher.22 When Christopher
resisted, Payne became violent.221 - Payne repeatedly stabbed
Christopher, her two-year-old daughter Lacie, and her three-year-old
son Nicholas with a butcher knife.22 2 Charisse and Lacie were found
dead on the kitchen floor."2 Miraculously, Nicholas survived, despite
a wound that completely penetrated his body from front to back.22 4
214 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Id. at 827. See also generally Christine D. Marton, Comment, The Admissibility of
Victim Impact Evidence at the Sentencing Phase of a Capital Trial, 31 DuQ. L. REv. 801
(1993) (expressing the opinion that the Supreme Court's decision in Payne represents a
beneficial change in the Court's death penalty jurisprudence).
218 Payne, 501 U.S. at 811.
2 19 Id. at 812.
220 ld.
221 Id.
222 Id. at 812-13.
223 Payne, 501 U.S. at 813.
224 Id.
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The police immediately apprehended Payne, who was so covered in
blood that, according to the arresting officer, Payne appeared to be
"'sweating blood."'2 25
Despite overwhelming evidence against him,226 Payne insisted
that he was innocent?27 The jury quickly convicted Payne.22 During
the sentencing phase of the trial, Payne presented the testimony of
four individuals to attest to his character.229 The state rebutted the
testimony of those witnesses with the testimony of Charisse
Christopher's mother, Mary Zvolanek.2 30 The prosecutor asked
Zvolanek how the. murders had affected Zvolanek's grandson,
Nicholas, to which she responded:
He cries for his mom. He doesn't seem to understand
why she doesn't come home. And he cries for his
sister Lacie. He comes to me many times during the
week and asks me, Grandma, 'do you miss my Lacie?'
And I tell him 'yes.' He says, 'I'm worried about my
Lacie.'23'
In his final argument, the prosecutor told the jury:
225 Id. at 812.
226 Id. at 812-13. Other evidence introduced by the prosecution included three cans of
malt liquor which were found near the bodies and which bore Payne's fingerprints Id.
Additionally, Payne's baseball cap was snapped onto Lacie's arm, and the blood found on
Payne when he was apprehended matched the blood types of the victims. Id.
227 Id. at 813.
228 Payne, 501 U.S. at 811.
229 Id. at 814. Payne put his father, mother, a friend and a clinical psychologist on the
stand. Id. The psychologist testified that Payne was the most polite prisoner he had ever
met. Id.
230 Id.
231 Id. at 814-15.
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There is obviously nothing you can do for Charisse
and Lacie Jo. But there is something you can do for
Nicholas. Somewhere down the road Nicholas is
going to grow up, hopefully. And he is going to want
to know what happened to his baby sister and his
mother. He is going to want to know what type of
justice was done .... With your verdict, you will
provide the answer.232
The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and
sentence, saying that Mrs. Zvolanek's testimony was "technically
irrelevant," but its admission constituted harmless error because it did
not create a "constitutionally unacceptable risk of an arbitrary
imposition of the death penalty. '233 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari and affirmed the Tennessee Supreme Court's decision.3
The Court began its analysis by reviewing the basic
underlying premises of the Booth decision.2 35  First, the Payne
majority disagreed with the Booth Court's determinationthat evidence
which relates to the harm done to the victim's family is not a
reflection on the defendant's blameworthiness.236 Second, the Payne
Court took issue with the Booth Court's holding that only evidence
that reflects on blameworthiness is relevant at the sentencing phase of
a capital case. 237  Rather, the Payne majority stated that the
assessment of harm caused by the defendant as a result of the crime
232 Id. at 815.
233 State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10 (1991).
234 Payne, 501 U.S. at 817.
235 Id. at 817-18.
236 Id. at 819.
237 Id.
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has historically been an important element of criminal law.238
Additionally, the Court rejected the Booth conclusion that a defendant
is unable to fairly rebut evidence of the victim's character. 239 The
Court stated that, in many cases, evidence concerning the victim's
character is already presented to the jury during the guilt/innocence
phase of the trial.24° Similarly, the Court reasoned that it is improper
to exclude evidence based solely on tactical considerations, and that
the relevant weight of such evidence is for the fact-finder to
determine.241
Further, the Court took issue with the premise that a jury will
be more sympathetic to a victim who was an asset to his community
than to a victim who was perceived as less worthy.242 The Court
stated that victim impact evidence is designed to, show the
"uniqueness" of each individual,243 and that it is up to the jury to
consider what the loss of that individual may be to the community.4
According to the Court, victim impact evidence is just another means
of informing the fact-finder about the specific harm caused by the
crime.245  Furthermore, should evidence be introduced that is so
prejudicial "that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair, the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 246 provides a
238 Id. The Court gave the example of two separate robbery defendants. Id. If one
defendant killed during the commission of the crime, that defendant could be executed. Id.
However, the defendant who did not kill could not be executed. Id.
239 Payne, 501 U.S. at 823.
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 Id. at 823-24.
243 Id.
244 Payne, 501 U.S. at 824.
241 Id. at 825.
246 The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in relevant
parts, that
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
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mechanism of relief. 247 Thus, according to the Court, victim impact
statements do not lead to arbitrary decisions to impose the death
penalty, and states may utilize them at their prerogative.248
VII. New York State and
Victim Impact Statements
In 1972, the New York Court of Appeals made it clear that
oral victim impact statements at sentencing were unconstitutionally
prejudicial to the defendant? 49 The Court reasoned that victim impact
statements would "becloud the judicial atmosphere and ... unbalance
the... process of sentencing." 250 In fact, New York did not provide
crime victims with any voice in the sentencing of offenders.25'
Then, following the language of the federal Victim and
abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
247 Payne, 501 U.S. at 825:
248 d. at 827 (citing Justice Cardozo in Snyder v. Massachusetts,291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934),
"[Jiustice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept of fairness
must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance true.").
249 People v. Julia, 333 N.Y.S.2d 978 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972), modified on other grounds,
349 N.Y.S.2d 648 (2d Dept. 1973), affd, 370 N.Y.S.2d 898 (N.Y. 1973), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 868 (1975). The Court in this case was confronted with prejudicial comments from two
strangers to the proceeding. Id. The Court held that those comments were purposefully
made to intimidate the Court and to interfere with sentencing. Id The Court ordered a
reversal and remanded for a new sentence. Id.
250 Julia, 333 N.Y.S.2d at 980.
251 Abraham Abramovsky, Victim Impact Statements: Adversely Impacting Upon Judicial
Fairness, 8 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 21 (1992).
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
Witness Protection Act of 1982,252 New York amended Article 390 of
the Criminal Procedure Law to allow the submission of written victim
impact statements to the probation department as a discretionary
component of the pre-sentence report.253 Crime victims and family
members could give their statements about the crime to a probation
officer, who would in turn include that information in a report
submitted to the sentencing court." 4 The 1982 statute was designed
to provide the judge255 with background information about the
circumstances surrounding the offense and any relevant information
regarding the defendant's background, but not necessarily with victim
information. 6 Only when the court deemed the victim information
essential to sentencing would any victim statements be included in the
report. 7
In 1992, the New York State Legislature amended Article 380
of the Criminal Procedure Law to allow for the admission of the same
victim information, only this time victims could speak at the
sentencing phase of felony cases.258 According to the statute, the
victim may "make a statement with regard to any matter relevant to
the question of sentence. 259
On September 1, 1995, New York's new death penalty law
252 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1512-1515. See also Sensationaligtic Victim Statements at Sentencing
of Colin Ferguson, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 17, 1995, at 9.
253 N.Y. CRAM. PROC. LAW § 390.20(l) (McKinney 1991 &'Supp. 1992).
254 See generally N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 390.20 (McKinney 1991); N.Y. CRM. PROC.
LAW § 390.30 (McKinney 1991).
255 N.Y. CRiM. PROC. LAW § 390.20. With the exception of New York's new death
penalty law, decisions on sentences are for the court, not the jury. Id.
256 Abramovsky,supra note 25 1, at 22. The information included the defendant's social,
economic, educational and family history. Id.
257N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 390.30(2)(McKinney 1991 & Supp. 1992). The information
taken from victims included the victim's version of the crime, the extent of the economic
impact of the crime, and the victim's views relating to the disposition of the case. Id.
258 N.Y. CRiM. PROC. LAW § 380.50(2)(b) (McKinney 1992).
259 ld
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went into effect.26° The law does not make any mention of victim
impact statements, so they are presumably allowable at the sentencing
phase of capital cases in New York."' New York State prosecutors
hope that since victim impact evidence is allowed in federal courts,
that they will also be allowed at the state level.262
VIII. The Arguments Against
Victim Impact Statements
A. Victim Impact Statements Lead to
Disparate Treatment of Similarly Situated Defendants263
The most commonly voiced objection to victim impact
statements is the inherent possibility that they violate a defendant's
right to equal protection?64 The Supreme Court has consistently held
that capital sentences may not be arbitrary or capricious in any
form.2 65 In New York, for example, previous death penalty statutes
have been invalidated because they did not allow the trier of fact to
260 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 38 (McKinney 1995).
261 See generally N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (McKinney 1995); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 400.27 (McKinney 1995).
262 John Milgrim, State, Federal Death Laws Differ, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 16, 1996, at 4.
263 See generally Abramovsky, supra note 251. See also Michael Ira Oberlander, Note,
The Payne ofAllowing Victim Impact Statements at Capital Sentencing Hearings, 45 VAND.
L. REV. 1621 (1992).
264 Abramovsky, supra note 251, at 22. The Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
Clause provides in, relevant part, that "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
... deny to any person within itsjurisdictionthe equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, §I. This clause essentially guarantees two things: "(1) that people who are
similarly situated will be treated similarly; and (2) that people who are not similarly situated
will not be treated similarly." STEVEN L. EMANUEL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 231 (1994).
.65 See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976).
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weigh all the relevant circumstances surrounding the offense.266 The
use of victim impact statements changes the focus of the crime from
the defendant to the victim.267 When the sentencing jury considers a
family member's victim impact statement, the eloquence of that
speaker may play a role in the jury's decision.268 In fact, some states
even allow victims' family members to hire attorneys to present their
statements for them.269 Consequently, a wealthy family would be able
to secure an articulate speaker, while a poor family may not be able
to afford one at all.27°
"Justice should not bebased on the victim's eloquence,
financial position, or family's presence but on the severity of the
crime. 271  The defendant should only be responsible for the
circumstances under which he had control.2 72 The fact that a victim
was a wealthy local philanthropist should not weigh more heavily
against the defendant than it would if the victim was an indigent with
no family.273
[W]hen our society is choosing which heinous
murderers to kill and which to spare, its gaze ought to
be carefully fixed on the harm they have caused and
their moral culpability for that harm, not on irrelevant
fortuities such as the social position, articulateness,
266 See People v. Davis, 400 N.Y.S.2d 735 (1977).
267 Booth, 482 U.S. at 504 (citing Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304).
268 Oberlander, supra note 263, at 1658-59. In a recent murder case in Georgia, one
commentatornoted that during the heart-wrenching victim impact testimony of the victim's
sister, at least half of the jury members and almost the entire courtroom gallery was openly
crying. Primetime Justice, (Court TV television broadcast, Mar. 10, 1997).
269 Oberlander, supra note 263, at 1659.
270 Id.
271 Abramovsky, supra note 251, at 23.
272 Oberlander, supra note 263, at 1659.
273 Abramovsky, supra note 25 1, at 23.
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and race of their victims and their victims' families.274
B. Victim Opinions Should Not Be Admitted
During the Sentencing Phase275
The Payne Court627 ' by declining to address the admissibility
of victims' opinions concerning the sentence they believe is
warranted, left open the possibility that such victim impact statements
will be admissible.277 Indeed, in the Colin Ferguson case,278 one of
the victims, Frank Barker, stated before the Court that he believed the
defendant should be sentenced to death for his crimes. 279 According
to the Supreme Court, however, the decision to impose the death
penalty may not be based on emotion, but, rather, upon reason.28°
And even though victim opinions are considered of little legal impact
by some commentators, they again impermissibly focus the attention
of the jury on the victim and on circumstances about which the
defendant had no knowledge when he or she committed the crime.28'
Similarly, victim statements that speculate as to what could
have happened may also be admissible. 82 For example, in a recent
assault case, a victim stated that "if the blade had struck a few
millimeters to the left, [I] would be paralyzed, and if the blade had
274 Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
361, 398 (1996). .
275See generally Abramovsky, supra note 251. See also Oberlander, supra note 263.
276 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
277 See generally id.
27 See supra Section I.
... See, e.g., Randolph, supra note 12, at Al.
28" Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 508 (1987).
281 Oberlander, supra note 263, at 1657-58.
282 Abramovsky, supra note 25 1, at 32.
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been an inch longer, [I] would probably be dead." '283 This statement
is not only inadmissible at trial, but it is almost entirely
unsubstantiated and irrefutable at the sentencing phase without
holding a mini-trial as to all the possible variations of the offense.28 4
C. Victim Impact Statements Do Not
Further The Goals of Sentencing"8 5
Sentencing in criminal cases is said to serve all or part of four
purposes: (1) retribution; (2) deterrence; (3) incapacitation, and (4)
rehabilitation.28 6
Retribution is what society seeks, vengeance is what the
victim wants.287 Unlike other sentencing goals, the concept of societal
retribution necessarily forces the sentencing agent to focus on the
defendant, not on the needs of society.2"' In determining a
proportionate sentence, the sentencing agent will look to the
defendant's moral blameworthiness and measure it against some
standard.2 89 The sentencing agent should assess society's sense of the
defendant's blameworthiness, not the victim's, since the defendant,
ultimately, acted against society.29° When victim impact statements
are presented, the sentencing agent is invited to consider the victim's
213 Id. at 31.
284 Id.
28. See generally Abramovsky, supra note 251. See also Oberlander, supra note 263.
286 Oberlander, supra note 263, at 1650.
2 7 Id. at 165 1.
288 Id.
289 Id. at 1651-52 (stating that a defendant ; morality is compared to a baseline of societal
morality).
290 Oberlander, supra note 263, at 1651-52. See also Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs
of Victim 'sRights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937, 991 (1995) (discussing society's right to retaliate
against those who have harmed society or broken its rules).
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perspective which unconstitutionally shifts the focus away from the
defendant?9' Furthermore, vengeance is an inappropriate rationale for
allowing the use of victim impact statements.2 92 Vengeance is pure
anger manifested by uncontrollable, prejudicial outbursts.2 93 This
leads to disproportionate sentencing which hinges on the eloquence
(or mere presence) of family members.294
Deterrence, both general and specific, is often cited as the
impetus for having a death penalty.2 95 However, while it may be
argued that a death penalty will deter future killing, it is difficult to
say that victim impact statements add anything to that argument.296
Because victim impact statements effectively make sentences
arbitrary and capricious, criminals who believe that they will obtain
different treatment with different victims may well not be deterred at
all.297 Deterrence cannot be effective when those who society seeks
to deter do not know what factors the sentencing agent will
consider?98 How can society believe that a defendant would be at all
deterred if he or she, at the time of the killing, is unaware of the
victim's characteristics which may later be admitted to reach a
sentencing decision?299
Incapacitation is an important goal in sentencing in that it
seeks to separate those individuals who cannot live by society's rules
29! Oberlander, supra note 263, at 1652; Henderson, supra note 290, at 991-92.
292 Oberlander, supra note 263, at 1652-53.
293 Id.
294 Id. at 1653.
293 Id. at 1654. See also Henderson, supra note 290, at 987-88 (defining general
deterrence as punishment designed to encourage others from committing a specified act, and
specific deterrence as punishment designed to discourage the individual from committing
a wrongful act again).
296 Oberlander, supra note 263, at 1654.
297 id.
298 Id.
299 Id. at 1654-55.
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from those who can.3°° In determining the length of incapacitation,
the sentencing agent must consider the likelihood of future
dangerousness.' While a determination concerning the nature of the
crime can be an important component of this decision, victim impact
statements are not the only means by which sentencing agents may
learn about the circumstances surrounding the crime.30 2
Finally, the goal of rehabilitation is focused primarily on the
defendant.30 3 Under this rationale, the defendant's sentence depends
on the likelihood of society's success at rehabilitating him.
304
Considerations about whether the defendant can learn to live by
society's rules bear no relationship to the characteristics of the
victim.30 5 Therefore, victim impact statements do not add anything to
the determination of whether the defendant may be rehabilitated.3
0 6
IX. Victim Impact Statements and
the Death Penalty
As a felony, murder, naturally, constitutes a category of crime
in which the use of victim impact statements is permitted.30 7 As of
June, 1995, forty-one states and the federal government allowed the
victim the right to speak at sentencing for a violent felony
conviction?° New York's new death penalty law makes no mention
of victim impact evidence at the sentencing phase of a capital crime,
300 Id. at 1655.
3'0 Oberlander, supra note 263, at 1655; Henderson, supra note 290, at 989-90.
302 Oberlander, supra note 263, at 1655.
303 Id.; Henderson, supra note 290, at 990.
304 Oberlander, supra note 263, at 1656.
305 id.; Henderson, supra note 290, at 990.
306 Oberlander, supra note 263, at 1656.
307 Interview with Michael R. Ambrecht, supra note 21.
308 Andrew Blum, Impact of Crimes Shakes Sentencing, NAT. L.J., June 26, 1995, at Al.
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so. this evidence is presumed to be admissible, subject to the
procedures outlined in the felony sentencing guidelines? °9 In fact, the
question of whether to include victim impact statements never came
up during the legislative negotiations in Albany.3"' It seems likely,
therefore, that prosecutors in New York will attempt to utilize victim
impact statements at the sentencing phase of capital cases."1
In neighboring New Jersey, the power to use victim impact
statements in capital cases is provided by statute.3 2 According to the
New Jersey law, if the defendant presents any evidence with regard
to his character, the prosecution may "present evidence of the murder
victim's character and background and of the impact of the murder on
the victim's survivors."3 3  The law, which Governor Christine
Whitman signed in late June, 1995, allows a murder victim's family
members to address the jury orally and to tell the jury how the family
has been affected by the killing.1
In Pennsylvania, victims are allowed to submit, for the court's
consideration, written statements detailing the physical, psychological
and economic impact of the crime on the victim and on the victim's
309 See generally N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (McKinney 1995); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 390.30 (McKinney 1991 & Supp. 1992); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 380.50 (McKinney
1992).
3 0 Interview with Michael R. Ambrecht, supra note 21.
3 ' Addressby Richmond (NY) County DistrictAttorney William Murphy, in New York,
N.Y. (Oct. 16, 1995).
312 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 11-3(6) (West 1995).
33
13 Id.
314 News in Brief, NEW JERSEY LAWYER, June 26, 1995, at 2. A challenge to this law
reached the New Jersey Supreme Court but was unsuccessful. State v. Rasheed Muhammad,
678 A.2d 164 (N.J. 1996). The Court noted, however, that only one relative could speak to
the jury and that all remarks must first be approved by the presiding judge. Id. at 180. See
also William G. Klienknecht, Victims'Rights Advocates on a Roll, NAT. L. J., July 15, 1996,
at Al; William Glaberson, The Supreme Court: Victims; Court Backs Statements By
Survivors, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1996, at 9.
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family.". 5 Believing it to be good therapy for victims, at least one
Pennsylvania judge allows the victims to speak before the court.3 16
New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania all allow victims to
speak at sentencing within the boundaries laid down by the Supreme
Court.3"7 But critics consistently raise several questions with regard
to the use of victim impact statements? 18 As one commentator notes:
Victim impact statements evoke not merely sympathy,
pity, and compassion for the victim, but also a
complex set of emotions directed toward the
defendant, including hatred, fear, racial animus,
vindictiveness, undifferentiated vengeance, and the
desire to purge collective anger. These emotional
reactions have a crucial common thread: they all
deflect the jury from its duty to consider the individual
defendant and his moral culpability.3"9
X. Conclusion
New York's new death penalty law, while narrowly drawn so
as to punish only those crimes considered most "evil" by society, still
suffers from the likelihood of inclusion of victim impact statements
'15 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 180-9.3(15) (West 1990 & Supp. 1996).
316 Samuel B. Fineman, A Conversation with Judge Lisa A. Richette, Philadelphia
Common Pleas Court, PENNSYLVANIALAW WEEKLY, Aug.7, 1995, at 7. The Pennsylvania
statute specifically allows written victim impact statements, and it does not expressly
prohibit verbal statements. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 180-9.3 (West 1990 & Supp. 1996).
3 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
318 See generally Abramovsky,supra note 251. See also Victim Justice: Sensationalistic
Victim Statements at Sentencing of Colin Ferguson, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 14, 1995 at
9; Oberlander, supra note 263.
319 Bandes, supra note 274, at 395.
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at the sentencing phase of the case. While society cannot fault
victims for the feelings they experience as a result of criminal acts, it
is improper to allow those victims to channel their pain and anger at
the defendant's sentencing hearing. States should, instead, act to
assist victims in ways that do not encroach on a defendant's
constitutional rights. For instance, Hawaii has enacted a law that
guarantees the victim a role in the prosecution of the defendant, and
simultaneouslyprotects the rights of the defendant?2 ° Under Hawaii's
law, victims are notified about major developments and delays in the
case, and when the defendant is released from custody."' Also,
prosecutors are required to consult with victims during the plea
bargaining phase.322 Victims in Hawaii are given counseling about
financial assistance available to them as well as other social
services."' During the trial, Hawaii provides victims with secure
waiting areas away from the defendant.32 4 That state also quickly
returns any property lost during the crime to the victim once it is no
longer needed as evidence.325
Under current New York law, crime victims may request from
the district attorney's office the final disposition of the case.326 The
district attorney has sixty days from the final disposition to notify the
victims by mail.327 Only if the defendant is committed to a
correctional facility will a victim be allowed to submit a victim
impact statement to the state division of parole.328
Until the New York legislature decides to restrict the use of
320 Oberlander, supra note 263, at 1660. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 801D-4 (1993).
321 HAW. REV. STAT. § 801D-4 (1993).
322 Id. § 801 D-4(1).
323 Id. § 801D-4(4).
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325 Id. § 801D-4(6).
326 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.50(l) (McKinney 1995).
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victim impact statements at capital sentencing, the potential remains
for a capital defendant to face his or her death, in part, as a result of
the characteristics of the victim and the victim's family. At the very
least, the New York legislature should read the Supreme Court's
decision in Payne329 narrowly and only allow the introduction of
victim impact statements through the prosecutor, not through the live
oral testimony of grief-stricken victims. New York should follow the
example set by Hawaii. It should give crime victims the opportunity
to express their anguish through means that do not infringeon the
constitutional rights of criminal defendants.
William Hauptman
329 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
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